

## TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT 2021/22

### Introduction

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means ensuring that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially, before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer-term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer-term cash may involve arranging long or short-term loans, or using longer-term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

The contribution the treasury management function makes to the Council is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

“The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”

This strategy covers the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code, MHCLG MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and MHCLG Investment Guidance.

Investments held for service purposes or for commercial profit are considered in a different report, the Investment Strategy.

### Treasury Management Reporting

The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main treasury reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

- a. **Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** (this report) - This first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:
  - the capital forecast summary;

- the treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised), including treasury indicators; and
  - an investment strategy, (the parameters on how treasury investments are to be managed).
- b. A mid-year treasury management report** – This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the treasury position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.
- c. An annual treasury report** – This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

### **Scrutiny**

The above reports and strategies are required to be adequately scrutinised before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit and Accounts Committee.

### **Training**

The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny. Training has been undertaken by members on 25<sup>th</sup> November 2020 and 20<sup>th</sup> January 2021 and further training will be arranged as required.

The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

### **Treasury Management Consultants**

The Council uses Link Group, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, treasury advisers.

It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

### **Capital Summary and Liability Benchmark**

On 31<sup>st</sup> December 2020, the Council held £98m of borrowing and £64m of investments. Forecast changes in these sums are shown in the balance sheet analysis table below.

## Capital summary and forecast

	<b>31.3.20 Actual £'000</b>	<b>31.3.21 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.22 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.23 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.24 Forecast £'000</b>
General Fund CFR	26,262	31,445	42,772	58,759	59,185
HRA CFR	106,638	109,183	118,178	123,255	122,780
<b>Total CFR</b>	<b>132,900</b>	<b>140,628</b>	<b>160,950</b>	<b>182,014</b>	<b>181,965</b>
Less: Other debt liabilities	-224	-224	-224	-224	-224
<b>Loans CFR</b>	<b>132,676</b>	<b>140,404</b>	<b>160,726</b>	<b>181,790</b>	<b>181,741</b>
Less: External borrowing	-91,356	-94,830	-88,501	-81,969	-76,435
<b>Internal (over) borrowing</b>	<b>41,320</b>	<b>45,574</b>	<b>72,225</b>	<b>99,821</b>	<b>105,306</b>
Less: Usable reserves	-57,902	-49,820	-32,696	-27,679	-26,989
Less: Working capital	-9,193	-10,500	-10,500	-10,500	-10,500
<b>Investments (or New borrowing)</b>	<b>25,775</b>	<b>14,746</b>	<b>-29,029</b>	<b>-61,642</b>	<b>-67,817</b>

The underlying need to borrow for capital purposes is measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), while usable reserves and working capital are the underlying resources available for investment. The Council's current strategy is to maintain borrowing and investments below their underlying levels, sometimes known as internal borrowing.

The Council has an increasing CFR due to the proposed capital programme, and diminishing investments and will therefore be required to borrow up to a minimum of an additional £68m over the forecast period.

CIPFA's *Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities* recommends that the Council's total debt should be lower than its highest forecast CFR over the next three years. The table above shows that the Council expects to comply with this recommendation during 2021/22.

**Liability benchmark:** A liability benchmark has been calculated showing the lowest level of borrowing required. This assumes the same forecasts as the table above, but that cash and investment balances are kept to a minimum level of £10m, as per MiFID II, at each year-end to maintain sufficient liquidity but minimise credit risk.

	<b>31.3.20 Actual £'000</b>	<b>31.3.21 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.22 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.23 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.24 Forecast £'000</b>
Loans CFR	132,676	140,404	160,726	181,790	181,741
Less: Usable reserves	-57,902	-49,820	-32,696	-27,679	-26,989
Less: Working capital	-9,193	-10,500	-10,500	-10,500	-10,500
Plus: Minimum investments	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
<b>Liability Benchmark</b>	<b>75,581</b>	<b>90,084</b>	<b>127,530</b>	<b>153,611</b>	<b>154,252</b>

## **Borrowing Strategy**

The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Council's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions.

**Objectives:** The Council's chief objective when borrowing money is to strike an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving certainty of those costs over the period for which funds are required. The flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Council's long-term plans change is a secondary objective.

### **Current Borrowing portfolio position**

The Council's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2020, with forward projections are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

	<b>31.3.20 Actual £'000</b>	<b>31.3.21 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.22 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.23 Forecast £'000</b>	<b>31.3.24 Forecast £'000</b>
<b>External Debt</b>					
Debt at 1 April	90,080	91,580	95,054	88,725	82,193
Expected change in Debt	1,276	3,250	-6,553	-6,756	-5,758
Other long-term liabilities	224	224	224	224	224
<b>Actual gross debt at 31 March</b>	<b>91,580</b>	<b>95,054</b>	<b>88,725</b>	<b>82,193</b>	<b>76,659</b>
<b>The Capital Financing Requirement</b>	<b>132,900</b>	<b>140,628</b>	<b>160,950</b>	<b>182,014</b>	<b>181,965</b>

Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2021/22 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue purposes.

### **Treasury Indicators: limits to borrowing activity**

**Operational Boundary for External Debt:** The operational boundary is based on the Council's estimate of most likely (i.e. prudent but not worst case) scenario for external debt. It links directly to the Council's estimates of capital expenditure, the capital financing requirement and cash flow requirements, and is a key management tool for in-year monitoring. Other long-term liabilities comprise of finance leases, Private Finance Initiatives and other liabilities that are not borrowing but form part of the Council's debt.

<b>Operational Boundary</b>	<b>2020/21 Revised £'000</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £'000</b>
Borrowing	145,628	165,950	187,014	186,965
Other long-term liabilities	400	400	400	400
<b>Total Debt</b>	<b>146,028</b>	<b>166,350</b>	<b>187,414</b>	<b>187,365</b>

**Authorised Limit for External Debt:** The authorised limit is the affordable borrowing limit determined in compliance with the Local Government Act 2003. It is the maximum amount of debt that the Council can legally owe. The authorised limit provides headroom over and above the operational boundary for unusual cash movements.

<b>Authorised Limit</b>	<b>2020/21 Limit £'000</b>	<b>2021/22 Limit £'000</b>	<b>2022/23 Limit £'000</b>	<b>2023/24 Limit £'000</b>
Borrowing	152,628	172,950	194,014	193,965
Other long-term liabilities	600	600	600	600
<b>Total Debt</b>	<b>153,228</b>	<b>173,550</b>	<b>194,614</b>	<b>194,565</b>

Separately, the Council has previously been limited to a maximum HRA CFR through the HRA self-financing regime and the Government set HRA Debt cap, however on 30 October 2018 the Government removed the HRA Debt cap. The Council deems it prudent to have a limit on the borrowing for the HRA, therefore it has chosen to use the Interest Cover Ratio (ICR) as its borrowing boundary for the HRA. The ICR represents the cover that the HRA has against its interest cost liabilities in any year. The ICR is set to a minimum which provides comfort that if there were a sudden drop in income or increase in operating costs, there would be sufficient headroom to continue to cover debt interest payments. The typical lending covenants used with the ratio varies between 1.10 and 1.50, the lower rate represents less cover and higher rate represents more cover, the Council will use the most prudent approach and therefore use 1.50 within the ratio to provide the most comfort of interest costs cover. The ICR has been modelled into the current HRA 30 year business plan and the maximum additional debt capacity set is £20.444m in order to maintain affordability in each financial year:

<b>HRA Debt Limit</b>	<b>2020/21 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2021/22 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2022/23 Estimate £'000</b>	<b>2023/24 Estimate £'000</b>
HRA CFR	109,183	118,178	123,255	122,780
Additional ICR Debt Capacity	20,444	20,444	20,444	20,444
<b>HRA Authorised Limit</b>	<b>129,627</b>	<b>138,622</b>	<b>143,699</b>	<b>143,224</b>

**Maturity structure of borrowing:** This indicator is set to control the Council's exposure to refinancing risk. The upper and lower limits on the maturity structure of fixed and variable rate borrowing will be:

	Upper	Lower
Under 12 months	15%	0%
12 months and within 24 months	15%	0%
24 months and within 5 years	30%	0%
5 years and within 10 years	100%	0%
10 years and above	100%	0%

Time periods start on the first day of each financial year. The maturity date of borrowing is the earliest date on which the lender can demand repayment.

**Strategy:** The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded with loan debt as cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy is prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue that needs to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2021/22 treasury operations. The Director of Resources/Deputy Chief Executive will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances.

The benefits of internal or short-term borrowing will be monitored regularly against the potential for incurring additional costs by deferring borrowing into future years when long-term borrowing rates are forecast to rise modestly. Link will assist the Council with this 'cost of carry' and breakeven analysis. Its output may determine whether the Council borrows additional sums at long-term fixed rates in 2021/22 with a view to keeping future interest costs low, even if this causes additional cost in the short-term.

Alternatively, the Council may arrange forward starting loans during 2020/21, where the interest rate is fixed in advance, but the cash is received in later years. This would enable certainty of cost to be achieved without suffering a cost of carry in the intervening period.

In addition, the Council may borrow (normally for up to one month) short-term loans to cover unplanned cash flow shortages.

**Sources of borrowing:** Currently the PWLB Certainty Rate is set at gilts + 80 basis points for both HRA and non-HRA borrowing. However, consideration may still need to be given to sourcing funding from the following additional sources.

The approved sources of long-term and short-term borrowing are:

- Public Works Loan Board (PWLB) and any successor body
- UK Municipal Bonds Agency plc any institution approved for investments (see below)
- any other bank or building society authorised to operate in the UK
- any other UK public sector body
- UK public and private sector pension funds
- capital market bond investors

Our advisors will keep us informed as to the relative merits of each of these alternative funding sources.

**LOBOs:** The Council holds £3.5m of LOBO (Lender's Option Borrower's Option) loans where the lender has the option to propose an increase in the interest rate at set dates, following which the Council has the option to either accept the new rate or to repay the loan at no additional cost. £3.5m of these LOBOs have options during 2021/22, and although the Council understands that lenders are unlikely to exercise their options in the current low interest rate environment, there remains an element of refinancing risk. The Council will take the option to repay LOBO loans at no cost if it has the opportunity to do so. Total borrowing via LOBO loans will be limited to £0m.

**Short-term and variable rate loans:** These loans leave the Council exposed to the risk of short-term interest rate rises and are therefore subject to the interest rate exposure limits in the treasury management indicators.

**Debt rescheduling:** The PWLB allows authorities to repay loans before maturity and either pay a premium or receive a discount according to a set formula based on current interest rates. Other lenders may also be prepared to negotiate premature redemption terms. Rescheduling of current borrowing in our debt portfolio is unlikely to occur. If rescheduling was done, it will be reported to Council, at the earliest meeting following its action.

**Policy on borrowing in advance of need:** The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates, and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

**Policy on internal borrowing interest to the HRA:** On 1st April 2012, the Council notionally split each of its existing long-term loans into General Fund and HRA pools. In the future, new long-term loans borrowed will be assigned in their entirety to one pool or the other.

Interest payable and other costs/income arising from long-term loans (e.g. premiums and discounts on early redemption) will be charged/ credited to the respective revenue account. Differences between the value of the HRA loans pool and the HRA's underlying need to borrow (capital financing requirement) will result in an internal borrowing situation. The internal borrowing on the HRA will be charged at the 25 year fixed maturity interest rate for PWLB for the 31<sup>st</sup> March for the relevant financial year with the credit going to the General Fund balance.

## Investment Strategy

### **Management of Risk**

The Council's investment policy has regard to the following: -

- MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance")
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the Code")
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018

The Council's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second and then yield, (return).

The above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA place a high priority on the management of risk. The Council has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk.

The Council holds invested funds, representing income received in advance of expenditure plus balances and reserves held. In the past 9 months, the Council's investment balance has ranged between £53 and £75 million. Levels available for investment are affected by capital expenditure and use of reserves, both will continue to be monitored throughout the financial year.

**Objectives:** As the CIPFA Code requires the Council to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its investments before seeking the highest rate of return, or yield. The Council's objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income. Where balances are expected to be invested for more than one year, the Council will aim to achieve a total return that is equal or higher than the prevailing rate of inflation, in order to maintain the spending power of the sum invested.

**Negative interest rates:** While the Bank of England said in August / September 2020 that it is unlikely to introduce a negative Bank Rate, at least in the next 6 -12 months, some deposit accounts are already offering negative rates for shorter periods. As part of the response to the pandemic and lockdown, the Bank and the Government have provided financial markets and businesses with plentiful access to credit, either directly or through commercial banks. In addition, the Government has provided large sums of grants to local authorities to help deal with the COVID crisis; this has caused some local authorities to have sudden large increases in cash balances searching for an investment home, some of which was only very short term until those sums were able to be passed on.

**Strategy:** Given the increasing risk and very low returns from short-term unsecured bank investments, the Council aims to diversify into more secure and/or higher yielding asset classes during 2021/22. This is especially the case for the estimated £10m that is potentially available for longer-term investment. The majority of the Council's surplus cash is currently invested in short-term unsecured bank deposits and money market funds.

**Business models:** As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2019/20 under IFRS 9, the Council will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund. (In November 2018, the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, [MHCLG], concluded a



consultation for a temporary override to allow English local authorities time to adjust their portfolio of all pooled investments by announcing a statutory override to delay implementation of IFRS 9 for five years commencing from 1.4.18.)

**Creditworthiness Policy;** The primary principle governing the Council’s investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose, it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council’s prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Director of Resources will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary.

Credit rating information is supplied by Link Group, our treasury advisors, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list. Any rating changes, rating Watches (notification of a likely change), rating Outlooks (notification of the longer-term bias outside the central rating view) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating Watch applying to counterparty at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all others being reviewed in light of market conditions.

**Use of additional information other than credit ratings.** Additional requirements under the Code require the Council to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the below criteria relies primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for officers to use, additional operational market information will be applied before making any investment decision from the agreed pool of counterparties. This additional market information (for example Credit Default Swaps, rating Watches/Outlooks) will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment opportunities.

**Time and monetary limits applying to investments.** The time and monetary limits for institutions on the Council’s counterparty list are as follows:

Credit rating	Banks unsecured	Banks secured	Government	Corporates	Registered Providers
UK Govt	n/a	n/a	£ Unlimited 50 years	n/a	n/a
AAA	£8m 5 years	£10m 20 years	£20m 50 years	£5m 20 years	£5m 20 years
AA+	£6m 5 years	£10m 10 years	£10m 25 years	£5m 10 years	£5m 10 years
AA	£6m 4 years	£10m 5 years	£10m 15 years	£5m 5 years	£5m 10 years

AA-	£6m 3 years	£10m 4 years		£5m 4 years	£5m 10 years
A+	£6m 2 years	£10m 3 years		£5m 3 years	£5m 5 years
A	£6m 13 months	£10m 2 years		£5m 2 years	£5m 5 years
A-	£5m 6 months	£10m 13 months		£5m 13 months	£5m 5 years
None		n/a			£5m 5 years
<b>Pooled funds and real estate investment trusts</b>		£15m per fund or trust			

This table must be read in conjunction with the notes below

**Credit rating:** Investment limits are set by reference to the lowest published long-term credit rating from a selection of external rating agencies. Where available, the credit rating relevant to the specific investment or class of investment is used, otherwise the counterparty credit rating is used. However, investment decisions are never made solely based on credit ratings, and all other relevant factors including external advice will be taken into account.

**Banks unsecured:** Accounts, deposits, certificates of deposit and senior unsecured bonds with banks and building societies, other than multilateral development banks. These investments are subject to the risk of credit loss via a bail-in should the regulator determine that the bank is failing or likely to fail. See below for arrangements relating to operational bank accounts.

**Banks secured:** Covered bonds, reverse repurchase agreements and other collateralised arrangements with banks and building societies. These investments are secured on the bank's assets, which limits the potential losses in the unlikely event of insolvency, and means that they are exempt from bail-in. Where there is no investment specific credit rating, but the collateral upon which the investment is secured has a credit rating, the higher of the collateral credit rating and the counterparty credit rating will be used to determine cash and time limits. The combined secured and unsecured investments in any one bank will not exceed the cash limit for secured investments.

**Government:** Loans, bonds and bills issued or guaranteed by national governments, regional and local authorities and multilateral development banks. These investments are not subject to bail-in, and there is generally a lower risk of insolvency, although they are not zero risk. Investments with the UK Central Government may be made in unlimited amounts for up to 50 years.

**Corporates:** Loans, bonds and commercial paper issued by companies other than banks and registered providers. These investments are not subject to bail-in, but are exposed to the risk of the company going insolvent. Loans to unrated companies will only be made as part of a diversified pool in order to spread the risk widely.

**Registered providers:** Loans and bonds issued by, guaranteed by or secured on the assets of registered providers of social housing and registered social landlords, formerly known as housing associations. These bodies are tightly regulated by the Regulator of Social Housing (in England), the Scottish Housing

Regulator, the Welsh Government and the Department for Communities (in Northern Ireland). As providers of public services, they retain the likelihood of receiving government support if needed.

**Pooled funds:** Shares or units in diversified investment vehicles consisting of the any of the above investment types, plus equity shares and property. These funds have the advantage of providing wide diversification of investment risks, coupled with the services of a professional fund manager in return for a fee. Short-term Money Market Funds that offer same-day liquidity and very low or no volatility will be used as an alternative to instant access bank accounts, while pooled funds whose value changes with market prices and/or have a notice period will be used for longer investment periods.

Bond, equity and property funds offer enhanced returns over the longer term, but are more volatile in the short term. These allow the Council to diversify into asset classes other than cash without the need to own and manage the underlying investments. Because these funds have no defined maturity date, but are available for withdrawal after a notice period, their performance and continued suitability in meeting the Council's investment objectives will be monitored regularly.

**Real estate investment trusts:** Shares in companies that invest mainly in real estate and pay the majority of their rental income to investors in a similar manner to pooled property funds. As with property funds, REITs offer enhanced returns over the longer term, but are more volatile especially as the share price reflects changing demand for the shares as well as changes in the value of the underlying properties.

**Operational bank accounts:** The Council will incur operational exposures through its current accounts, with Lloyds Bank. These are not classed as investments, but are still subject to the risk of a bank bail-in, and balances will therefore be kept below £750,000 net in the bank. The Bank of England has stated that in the event of failure, banks with assets greater than £25 billion are more likely to be bailed-in than made insolvent, increasing the chance of the Council maintaining operational continuity.

**Country and sector limits:** Due care will be taken to consider the country, group and sector exposure of the Council's investments.

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from countries with a minimum sovereign credit rating of AA (excluding UK) from Fitch (or equivalent). This list will be added to, or deducted from by officers should ratings change in accordance with this policy.

**Investment limits:** In order to limit the amount of reserves that will be potentially put at risk in the case of a single default, the maximum that will be lent to any one organisation (other than the UK Government) will be £15 million. A group of banks under the same ownership will be treated as a single organisation for limit purposes. Limits will also be placed on fund managers, investments in brokers' nominee accounts, foreign countries and industry sectors as below. Investments in pooled funds and multilateral development banks do not count against the limit for any single foreign country, since the risk is diversified over many countries.

## Investment limits

	<b>Cash limit</b>
Any single organisation, except the UK Central Government	£15m each
UK Central Government	unlimited
Any group of organisations under the same ownership	£15m per group
Any group of pooled funds under the same management	£15m per manager
Negotiable instruments held in a broker's nominee account	£10m per broker
Foreign countries	£10m per country
Registered providers and registered social landlords	£10m in total
Unsecured investments with building societies	£10m in total
Loans to unrated corporates	£15m in total
Local Authorities	£15m each
Money market funds	£12m each
Real estate investment trusts	£10m in total

**Liquidity management:** This diversification will represent a substantial change in strategy over the coming year, in line with the Council's approved Investment Strategy. The forecast is compiled on a prudent basis to minimise the risk of the Council being forced to borrow on unfavourable terms to meet its financial commitments. Limits on long-term investments are set by reference to the Council's medium-term financial plan and cash flow forecast.

**Policy on internal investment interest to the HRA:** On 1st April 2012, the Council notionally split each of its existing long-term loans into General Fund and HRA pools. Interest receivable for HRA balance sheet resources available for investment will result in a notional cash balance. This balance will be measured at the end of the financial year and interest transferred from the General Fund to the HRA at the average investment rate for a DMO investment for the financial year due to the General Fund carrying all the credit risk per investment.

**Investment returns expectations:** Bank Rate is unlikely to rise from 0.10% for a considerable period. It is very difficult to say when it may start rising so it may be best to assume that investment earnings from money market-related instruments will be sub 0.50% for the foreseeable future.

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial year are as follows:

2021/22	0.10%
2022/23	0.10%
2023/24	0.10%
2024/25	0.25%

### Treasury Indicators: limits to investing activity

The Council measures and manages its exposures to treasury management risks using the following indicators.

**Security:** The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the value-weighted average credit rating of its investment portfolio. This is calculated by applying a score to each investment (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) and taking the arithmetic average, weighted by the size of each investment. Unrated investments are assigned a score based on their perceived risk.

Credit risk indicator	Target
Portfolio average credit rating	A

**Liquidity:** The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to liquidity risk by monitoring the amount of cash available to meet unexpected payments within a banding period, without additional borrowing.

Liquidity risk indicator	Target	Limit
Total cash available within;		
3 months	30%	100%
3 – 12 months	40%	80%
Over 12 months	30%	50%

**Interest rate exposures:** This indicator is set to control the Council's exposure to interest rate risk. The upper limits on the one-year revenue impact of a 1% rise or fall in interest rates will be:

Interest rate risk indicator	Limit
Upper limit on one-year revenue impact of a 1% <u>rise</u> in interest rates	£200,000
Upper limit on one-year revenue impact of a 1% <u>fall</u> in interest rates	£200,000

The impact of a change in interest rates is calculated on the assumption that maturing loans and investments will be replaced at current rates.

**Principal sums invested for periods longer than a year:** The purpose of this indicator is to control the Council's exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments. The limits on the long-term principal sum invested to final maturities beyond the period end will be:

Price risk indicator	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
Limit on principal invested beyond year end	£15m	£15m	£15m

## **Treasury Management Practice (TMP1) – Credit and Counterparty Risk Management**

The MHCLG issued Investment Guidance in 2018, and this forms the structure of the Council's policy below. These guidelines do not apply to either trust funds or pension funds which operate under a different regulatory regime.

The key intention of the Guidance is to maintain the current requirement for Councils to invest prudently, and that priority is given to security and liquidity before yield. In order to facilitate this objective the guidance requires this Council to have regard to the CIPFA publication Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes. This Council adopted the Code and will apply its principles to all investment activity. In accordance with the Code, the Director of Resources has produced its treasury management practices (TMPs). This part, TMP 1, covering investment counterparty policy requires approval each year.

Annual investment strategy - The key requirements of both the Code and the investment guidance are to set an annual investment strategy, as part of its annual treasury strategy for the following year, covering the identification and approval of following:

- The strategy guidelines for choosing and placing investments.
- The principles to be used to determine the maximum periods for which funds can be committed.

**Strategy guidelines** – The main strategy guidelines are contained in the body of the treasury strategy statement and in accordance with the Code, the Council has set additional criteria to set the time and amount of monies which will be invested in institutions.

**The monitoring of investment counterparties** - The credit rating of counterparties will be monitored regularly. The Council receives credit rating information (changes, rating watches and rating outlooks) from Link Group as and when ratings change, and counterparties are checked promptly. On occasion ratings may be downgraded when an investment has already been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately by the Director of Resources, and if required new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list.

## Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation

### **(i) Full Council**

- receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities;
- approval of annual strategy.
- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices;
- budget consideration and approval;
- approval of the division of responsibilities;

### **(ii) Audit and Accounts Committee**

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body;
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations; and
- approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.

## **The Treasury Management Role of the Section 151 Officer**

### **The S151 (responsible) officer**

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers;
- preparation of a capital strategy to include capital expenditure, capital financing, and treasury management, with a long term timeframe;
- ensuring that the capital strategy is prudent, sustainable, affordable and prudent in the long term and provides value for money; and
- ensuring that due diligence has been carried out on all treasury is in accordance with the risk appetite of the authority.



## Economic Background and Interest Rate Forecast

**UK.** The key quarterly meeting of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee kept **Bank Rate** unchanged on 5.11.20. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a second national lockdown from 5.11.20 to 2.12.20 which is obviously going to put back economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. It therefore decided to do a further tranche of **quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn**, to start in January when the current programme of £300bn of QE, announced in March to June, runs out. It did this so that “announcing further asset purchases now should support the economy and help to ensure the unavoidable near-term slowdown in activity was not amplified by a tightening in monetary conditions that could slow the return of inflation to the target”.

Its forecasts appeared, at that time, to be rather optimistic in terms of three areas:

- The economy would recover to reach its pre-pandemic level in Q1 2022
- The Bank also expected there to be excess demand in the economy by Q4 2022.
- CPI inflation was therefore projected to be a bit above its 2% target by the start of 2023 and the “inflation risks were judged to be balanced”.

Significantly, there was no mention of **negative interest rates** in the minutes or Monetary Policy Report, suggesting that the MPC remains some way from being persuaded of the case for such a policy, at least for the next 6 -12 months. However, rather than saying that it “stands ready to adjust monetary policy”, the MPC this time said that it will take “whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit”. The latter seems stronger and wider and may indicate the Bank’s willingness to embrace new tools.

One key addition to **the Bank’s forward guidance in August** was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that “it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% target sustainably”. That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2% in a couple of years’ time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. Our Bank Rate forecast currently shows no increase, (or decrease), through to quarter 1 2024 but there could well be no increase during the next five years as it will take some years to eliminate spare capacity in the economy, and therefore for inflationary pressures to rise to cause the MPC concern. **Inflation** is expected to briefly peak at just over 2% towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short lived factor and so not a concern.

However, the minutes did contain several references to **downside risks**. The MPC reiterated that the “recovery would take time, and the risks around the GDP projection were judged to be skewed to the downside”. It also said “the risk of a more persistent period of elevated unemployment remained material”. Downside risks could well include severe restrictions remaining in place in some form during the rest of December and most of January too. **Upside risks** included the early roll out of effective vaccines.

**COVID-19 vaccines.** We had been waiting expectantly for news that various COVID-19 vaccines would be cleared as being safe and effective for administering to the general public. The Pfizer announcement on 9<sup>th</sup> November was very encouraging as its 90% effectiveness was much higher than the 50-60% rate of effectiveness of flu vaccines which might otherwise have been expected. However, this vaccine has demanding cold storage requirements of minus 70c that impairs the speed of application to the general population. It has therefore been particularly welcome that the Oxford University/AstraZeneca vaccine has now also been approved which is much cheaper and only requires fridge temperatures for storage. The Government has 60m doses on order and is aiming to vaccinate at a rate of 2m people per week starting in January, though this rate is currently restricted by a bottleneck on vaccine production; (a new UK production facility is due to be completed in June).


These announcements, plus expected further announcements that other vaccines could be approved soon, have enormously boosted confidence that **life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021**, with activity in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels returning to their pre-pandemic levels; this would help to bring the unemployment rate down. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for these services. A comprehensive roll-out of vaccines might take into late 2021 to fully complete; but if these vaccines prove to be highly effective, then there is a possibility that restrictions could start to be eased, beginning possibly in Q2 2021 once vulnerable people and front-line workers have been vaccinated. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines would radically improve the economic outlook once they have been widely administered; it may allow GDP to rise to its pre-virus level a year earlier than otherwise and mean that the unemployment rate peaks at 7% in 2021 instead of 9%.

**Public borrowing** was forecast in November by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PwLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery.

Overall, **the pace of recovery** was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp after quarter 1 saw growth at -3.0% followed by -18.8% in quarter 2 and then an upswing of +16.0% in quarter 3; this still left the economy 8.6% smaller than in Q4 2019. It is likely that the one month national lockdown that started on 5<sup>th</sup> November, will have caused a further contraction of 8% m/m in November so the economy may have then been 14% below its pre-crisis level.


**December 2020 / January 2021.** Since then, there has been rapid back-tracking on easing restrictions due to the spread of a new mutation of the virus, and severe restrictions were imposed across all four nations. These restrictions were changed on 5.1.21 to national lockdowns of various initial lengths in each of the four nations as the NHS was under extreme pressure. It is now likely that wide swathes of the UK will remain under these new restrictions for some months; this means that the near-term outlook for the economy is grim. However, the distribution of vaccines and the expected consequent removal of COVID-19 restrictions, should allow GDP to rebound rapidly in the second half of 2021 so that the economy could climb back to its pre-pandemic peak as soon as late in 2022. Provided that both monetary and fiscal policy are kept loose for a few years yet, then it is still possible that in the second half of this decade, the economy may be no smaller than it would have been if COVID-19 never happened. The significant caveat is if another mutation of COVID-19 appears that defeats the current batch of vaccines. However, now that science and technology have caught up with understanding this virus, new vaccines ought to be able to be developed more quickly to counter such a development and vaccine production facilities are being ramped up around the world.

Chart: Level of real GDP (Q4 2019 = 100)



This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to around 2.5% of GDP without any tax increases. This would be in line with the OBR’s most optimistic forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4% deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital Economics forecasts assumed that there is a reasonable Brexit deal and also that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, depress economic growth and recovery.

Chart: Public Sector Net Borrowing (as a % of GDP)



There will still be some **painful longer term adjustments** as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a reversal of globalisation as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, digital services are one area that has already seen huge growth.

**Brexit.** While the UK has been gripped by the long running saga of whether or not a deal would be made by 31.12.20, the final agreement on 24.12.20, followed by ratification by Parliament and all 27 EU countries in the following week, has eliminated a significant downside risk for the UK economy. The initial agreement only covers trade so there is further work to be done on the services sector where temporary equivalence has been granted in both directions between the UK and EU; that now needs to be formalised on a permanent basis. As the forecasts in this report were based on an assumption of a Brexit agreement being reached, there is no need to amend these forecasts.

**Monetary Policy Committee meeting of 17 December.** All nine Committee members voted to keep interest rates on hold at +0.10% and the Quantitative Easing (QE) target at £895bn. The MPC commented that the successful rollout of vaccines had reduced the downsides risks to the economy that it had

highlighted in November. But this was caveated by it saying, “Although all members agreed that this would reduce downside risks, they placed different weights on the degree to which this was also expected to lead to stronger GDP growth in the central case.” So, while the vaccine is a positive development, in the eyes of the MPC at least, the economy is far from out of the woods. As a result of these continued concerns, the MPC voted to extend the availability of the Term Funding Scheme, (cheap borrowing), with additional incentives for small and medium size enterprises for six months from 30.4.21 until 31.10.21. (The MPC had assumed that a Brexit deal would be agreed.)


**Fiscal policy.** In the same week as the MPC meeting, the Chancellor made a series of announcements to provide further support to the economy: -

- An extension of the COVID-19 loan schemes from the end of January 2021 to the end of March.
- The furlough scheme was lengthened from the end of March to the end of April.
- The Budget on 3.3.21 will lay out the “next phase of the plan to tackle the virus and protect jobs”. This does not sound like tax rises are imminent, (which could hold back the speed of economic recovery).

The **Financial Policy Committee** (FPC) report on 6.8.20 revised down their expected credit losses for the banking sector to “somewhat less than £80bn”. It stated that in its assessment, “banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC’s central projection”. The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC’s projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.

**US.** The result of **the November elections** meant that while the Democrats gained the presidency and a majority in the House of Representatives, it looks as if the Republicans could retain their slim majority in the Senate provided they keep hold of two key seats in Georgia in elections in early January. If those two seats do swing to the Democrats, they will then control both Houses and President Biden will consequently have a free hand to determine policy and to implement his election manifesto.

**The economy** had been recovering quite strongly from its contraction in 2020 of 10.2% due to the pandemic with GDP only 3.5% below its pre-pandemic level and the unemployment rate dropping below 7%. However, the rise in new cases during quarter 4, to the highest level since mid-August, suggests that the US could be in the early stages of a fourth wave. While the first wave in March and April was concentrated in the Northeast, and the second wave in the South and West, the third wave in the Midwest looks as if it now abating. However, it also looks as if the virus is rising again in the rest of the country. The latest upturn poses a threat that the recovery in the economy could stall. This is **the single biggest downside risk** to the shorter term outlook – a more widespread and severe wave of infections over the winter months, which is compounded by the impact of the regular flu season and, as a consequence, threatens to overwhelm health care facilities. Under those circumstances, states might feel it necessary to return to more draconian lockdowns.



The restrictions imposed to control the spread of the virus are once again weighing on the economy with employment growth slowing sharply in November and retail sales dropping back. The economy is set for further weakness in December and into the spring. However, a \$900bn fiscal stimulus deal passed by Congress in late December will limit the downside through measures which included a second round of direct payments to households worth \$600 per person and a three-month extension of enhanced unemployment insurance (including a \$300 weekly top-up payment for all claimants). GDP growth is expected to rebound markedly from the second quarter of 2021 onwards as vaccines are rolled out on a widespread basis and restrictions are loosened.

After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August 2020, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that *"it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time."* This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that officials expect to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year or two beyond that. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its inflation target, other major central banks will follow. The increase in tension over the last year between the US and China is likely to lead to a lack of momentum in progressing the initial positive moves to agree a phase one trade deal.

The Fed's meeting on **5 November** was unremarkable - but at a politically sensitive time around the elections. At its **16 December** meeting the Fed tweaked the guidance for its monthly asset quantitative easing purchases with the new language implying those purchases could continue for longer than previously believed. Nevertheless, with officials still projecting that inflation will only get back to 2.0% in 2023, the vast majority expect the fed funds rate to be still at near-zero until 2024 or later. Furthermore, officials think the balance of risks surrounding that median inflation forecast are firmly skewed to the downside. The key message is still that policy will remain unusually accommodative – with near-zero rates and asset purchases – continuing for several more years. This is likely to result in keeping Treasury yields low – which will also have an influence on gilt yields in this country.

**EU.** In early December, the figures for Q3 GDP confirmed that the economy staged a rapid rebound from the first lockdowns. This provides grounds for optimism about growth prospects for next year. In Q2, GDP was 15% below its pre-pandemic level. But in Q3 the economy grew by 12.5% q/q leaving GDP down by “only” 4.4%. That was much better than had been expected earlier in the year. However, growth is likely to stagnate during Q4 and in Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has affected many countries: it is likely to hit hardest those countries more dependent on tourism. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the countries most affected by the first wave.

With inflation expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, **the ECB** has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. The ECB’s December meeting added a further €500bn to the PEPP scheme, (purchase of government and other bonds), and extended the duration of the programme to March 2022 and re-investing maturities for an additional year until December 2023. Three additional tranches of TLTRO, (cheap loans to banks), were approved, indicating that support will last beyond the impact of the pandemic, implying indirect yield curve control for government bonds for some time ahead. The Bank’s forecast for a return to pre-virus activity levels was pushed back to the end of 2021, but stronger growth is projected in 2022. The total PEPP scheme of €1,850bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support. However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer, although growth will struggle before later in quarter 2 of 2021.

**China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in Q2 and then into Q3 and Q4; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China’s economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies. However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.

**Japan.** A third round of fiscal stimulus in early December took total fresh fiscal spending this year in response to the virus close to 12% of pre-virus GDP. That’s huge by past standards, and one of the largest national fiscal responses. The budget deficit is now likely to reach 16% of GDP this year. Coupled with Japan’s relative success in containing the virus without draconian measures so far, and the likelihood of effective vaccines being available in the coming months, the government’s latest fiscal effort should help ensure a strong recovery and to get back to pre-virus levels by Q3 2021 – around the same time as the US and much sooner than the Eurozone.

**World growth.** World growth will have been in recession in 2020. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.

Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering

costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

### Summary

**Central banks are, therefore, likely to support growth by maintaining loose monetary policy through keeping rates very low for longer. Governments could also help a quicker recovery by providing more fiscal support for their economies at a time when total debt is affordable due to the very low rates of interest. They will also need to avoid significant increases in taxation or austerity measures that depress demand in their economies.**

**If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.**

## INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

**Brexit.** The interest rate forecasts provided by Link below were predicated on an assumption of a reasonable agreement being reached on trade negotiations between the UK and the EU by 31.12.20. There is therefore no need to revise these forecasts now that a trade deal has been agreed. Brexit may reduce the economy's potential growth rate in the long run. However, much of that drag is now likely to be offset by an acceleration of productivity growth triggered by the digital revolution brought about by the COVID crisis.

### The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is still subject to some uncertainty due to the virus and the effect of any mutations, and how quick vaccines are in enabling a relaxation of restrictions.
- There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

### Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **UK government** takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand in the economy.
- **UK - Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**. The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact most likely for "weaker" countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions for the next two or three years. However, in the case of Italy, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, which could be undermined further depending on extent of credit losses resultant of the pandemic.
- **German minority government & general election in 2021**. In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in subsequent state elections but the SPD has done particularly badly. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she will remain as Chancellor until the general election in 2021. This then leaves a major question mark over who will be the major guiding hand and driver of EU unity when she steps down.
- **Other minority EU governments**. Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.



- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU, and they had threatened to derail the 7 year EU budget until a compromise was thrashed out in late 2020. There has also been a rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- **Geopolitical risks**, for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

#### **Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates**

- **UK** - a significant rise in inflationary pressures e.g. caused by a stronger than currently expected recovery in the UK economy after effective vaccines are administered quickly to the UK population, leading to a rapid resumption of normal life and return to full economic activity across all sectors of the economy.

The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation

## Interest Rate Forecasts 2021 – 2024

The PWLB rates below are based on the new margins over gilts announced on 26th November 2020. PWLB forecasts shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
<b>BANK RATE</b>	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
10 yr PWLB	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
25 yr PWLB	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
50 yr PWLB	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
<b>Bank Rate</b>													
Link	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
Capital Economics	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	-	-	-	-	-
<b>5yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Link	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Capital Economics	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	-	-	-	-	-
<b>10yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Link	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
Capital Economics	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	-	-	-	-	-
<b>25yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Link	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
Capital Economics	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	-	-	-	-	-
<b>50yr PWLB Rate</b>													
Link	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60
Capital Economics	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	-	-	-	-	-