

COUNCIL MEETING - 14 DECEMBER 2021

TREASURY MANAGEMENT 2021-22 MID YEAR REPORT

1.0 Purpose of Report

1.1 This report provides an update on the Council's treasury activity and prudential indicators for the first half of 2021/22. This was reported to the Audit & Accounts Committee on 1 December 2021.

2.0 Summary of Treasury Balances as at 30 September 2021

2.1 Below is a summary of the Council's borrowing position as at 30 September 2021, further information is available at section 6.

Balance on 01/04/2021	Narrative	Balance on 30/09/2021
£m		£m
95.212	Total Borrowings	95.010
0.224	Total Other Long Term Liabilities	0.224
95.436	TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT	95.234

2.2 Below is a summary of the Council's investment position as at 30 September 2021, further information is available at section 7.

Balance on 01/04/2021	Narrative	Balance on 30/09/2021
£m		£m
39.770	Total Short term Investments	50.230
7.500	Total Long term Investments	7.500
47.270	TOTAL INVESTMENTS	57.730

2.3 Below is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure position as at 30 September 2021, further information is available at section 5.

Capital Expenditure	2021/22	Current Expenditure	2021/22
	Initial Capital Budget	30/09/2021	Revised Estimate
	£m	£m	£m
General Fund Expenditure	32.326	4.125	19.711
HRA Expenditure	25.035	4.357	24.625
Total Capital Expenditure	57.361	8.482	44.337

2.4 **Prudential Indicators**, the Council can confirm no prudential indicators were breached during the first six months of financial period 2021/22, further information is available at section 9.

3.0 Introduction

3.1 This report has been written in accordance with the requirements of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (revised 2017). The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:

- Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Council's treasury management activities.
- Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
- Receipt by the full council of an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement - including the Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy - for the year ahead, a Mid-year Review Report and an Annual Report, (stewardship report), covering activities during the previous year.
- Delegation by the Council of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
- Delegation by the Council of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Council the delegated body is the Audit and Accounts Committee.

3.2 This mid-year report has been prepared in compliance with CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management, and covers the following:

- An economic update for the first part of the 2021/22 financial year;
- A review of the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy;
- The Council's capital expenditure, as set out in the Capital Strategy, and prudential indicators;
- A review of the Council's investment portfolio for 2021/22;
- A review of the Council's borrowing strategy for 2021/22;
- A review of any debt rescheduling undertaken during 2021/22;
- A review of compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits for 2021/22.

3.3 Treasury Management is defined as: "The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks".

3.4 The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the Council can meet its capital spending operations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses, and on occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

4.0 Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) and Annual Investment Strategy Update

4.1 The Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2021/22 was approved by Full Council on 9 March 2021. There are no suggested policy changes to the TMSS within this report; the details in this report update the position in the light of the updated economic position and capital budget changes approved at Policy and Finance throughout the year.

5.0 The Council's Capital Position

5.1 This part of the report is structured to update:

- The Council's capital expenditure plans;
- How these plans are being financed;
- The impact of the changes in the capital expenditure plans on the prudential indicators and the underlying need to borrow; and
- Compliance with the limits in place for borrowing activity.

5.2 The table below shows the revised estimates for capital expenditure and the changes since the Capital Programme was agreed within the Capital budget on 9 March 2021.

Capital Expenditure	2021/22	Current Expenditure	2021/22
	Capital Budget approved		Revised Estimate
	09-Mar-20		30-Sep-21
	£m	£m	£m
General Fund Expenditure	32.326	4.125	19.711
HRA Expenditure	25.035	4.357	24.625
Total Capital Expenditure	57.361	8.482	44.337
Financed by:			
Capital Receipts	2.389		3.066
Capital Grants	10.990		8.190
Capital Reserves	0.554		0.554
Revenue	16.163		19.448
Total Financing	30.096		31.259
Borrowing Requirement	27.265		13.078

5.3 The financing of the Capital Programme will be determined by the S151 Officer at the year-end based on best use of resources.

5.4 The decrease from the Budget approved 9 March 2021 relates to approved capital carry forward requests and approved variations to the capital programme as shown in the table below.

Original Capital Budgets - Approved 21/22	57.361
Capital Budget carry forwards 20-21 approved Policy and Finance 24.06.21	10.935
Policy & Finance 23.09.21 Approvals (Appendix C)	-13.531
Policy & Finance 25.11.21 Approvals (Appendix C)	-10.428
Revised Capital Budget 30.09.21	44.337

6.0 Borrowing Strategy

6.1 At 30 September 2021 the Council held £95.2m of loans, as part of its strategy for funding previous years' borrowing within those capital programmes.

6.2 Borrowing Activity in 2021/22

	Balance on 01/04/2021	Estimated Balance to year end - Made on 30/09/2021	Balance on 01/04/2021	Estimated Balance to year end - Made on 30/09/2021
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Short Term Borrowing	0.382	0.209	3.000	3.000
Long Term Borrowing	3.300	3.300	88.530	88.501
TOTAL BORROWING	3.682	3.509	91.530	91.501
Other Long Term Liabilities	0.224	0.224	0.000	0.000
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT	3.906	3.733	91.530	91.501
CFR	29.139	30.183	109.023	114.004
Under / (over) borrowing	25.232	26.449	17.493	22.504

6.3 As the Council is in a significant under borrowed position, as per the table in 6.2, there may be a requirement during the remainder of the financial year where new borrowing is required. Any new borrowing will be within the approved Treasury Management Borrowing Strategy framework and will have been reviewed by the S151 Officer for cost effectiveness as whether to borrow shorter term or long term in relation to interest rate forecasts.

6.4 **LOBOs:** The Council holds £3.5m of LOBO (Lender's Option Borrower's Option) loans where the lender has the option to propose an increase in the interest rate at set dates, following which the Council has the option to either accept the new rate or to repay the loan at no additional cost. All of the £3.5m of LOBOS had options during the last 6 months, none of which were exercised by the lender. The Council acknowledges there is an element of refinancing risk even though in the current interest rate environment lenders are unlikely to exercise their options.

6.5 **Internal Borrowing:** For the Council, the use of internal resources in lieu of borrowing has continued to be the most cost effective means of funding of capital expenditure that has not been funded from grants and other resources. This has lowered overall treasury risk by reducing both external debt and temporary investments. However this position will not be sustainable over the medium to longer term as the Council needs to use reserves for the purpose they were set aside for, and external borrowing may need to be undertaken.

6.6 **Debt Rescheduling:** The premium charge for early repayment of PWLB debt remains relatively expensive for the loans in the Council's portfolio and therefore unattractive for debt rescheduling activity. No rescheduling activity was undertaken or is proposed during the rest of the financial year as a consequence.

7.0 Investment Activity

7.1 The Guidance on Local Government Investments in England gives priority to security and liquidity and the Council's aim is to achieve a return commensurate with these principles.

7.2 Investment Activity in 2021/22

Type of Investment	Balance on 01/04/2021	Balance on 30/09/2021	Average Interest Rate
	£m	£m	
Short term Investments			
<i>Fixed Term Deposits:</i>			
Santander	5.000	5.000	0.55%
Lloyds 95 Day Notice	5.000	0.000	0.00%
Local Authority Investment	5.000	0.000	0.00%
Close Brothers	2.000	2.000	0.35%
Goldman Sachs	0.000	5.000	0.22%
<i>Money Market Funds:</i>			
Goldman Sachs	0.025	2.340	0.00%
Deutsche Bank	0.005	12.000	0.00%
Invesco	10.850	12.000	0.01%
CCLA	7.240	7.240	0.03%
<i>Bank Call Account:</i>			
Handelsbanken	4.650	4.650	0.01%
Total Short Term Investments	39.770	50.230	
Long term Investments			
CCLA Property Fund	4.000	4.000	3.64%
CCLA Diversified Income Fund	3.500	3.500	3.80%
Total Long Term Investments	7.500	7.500	
TOTAL INVESTMENTS	47.270	57.730	
Increase/ (Decrease) in Investments		10.460	

7.3 Both the CIPFA Code and government guidance require the Council to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its treasury investments before seeking the optimum rate of return, or yield. The Council's objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income.

7.4 The Council's budgeted investment return for 2021/22 is currently forecasting a £0.216m unfavourable variance. As shown by the interest rate forecasts in appendix 2, interest income is low currently. Some of the Money Market Funds and more recently the Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF), are offering negative rates of return in some shorter time periods. Given this risk environment and the fact that increases in Bank Rate are unlikely to occur before the end of the current forecast horizon of 31 March 2023, investment returns are expected to remain low.

8.0 Non-Treasury Investments

8.1 The definition of investments in CIPFA's revised Treasury Management Code now covers all the financial assets of the Council as well as other non-financial assets which the Council holds primarily for financial return or regeneration purposes. This is replicated in MHCLG's Investment Guidance, in which the definition of investments is further broadened to also include all such assets held partially for financial return or regeneration purposes.

8.2 Breakdown below of current Non-Treasury Investments held:

	Balances 30 September 2021 £m
Growth Investment Fund	£0.093
Loans to Housing Associations	£0.017
Loans to Parish Councils	£0.014
Loans to RHH Ltd	£0.000

These investments are due to generate £0.002m of investment income for the Council after taking account of direct costs, representing a rate of return of 5.44%.

9.0 Prudential Indicators

Breach of Indicators

9.1 There have been no breaches of the prudential indicators in the first six months of the financial year 2021/22.

Limit To Borrowing Activity

9.2 **Authorised Limit and Operational Boundary for External Debt.** The Local Government Act 2003 requires the Council to set an Affordable Borrowing Limit, irrespective of their indebted status. This is a statutory limit which should not be breached. The Operational Boundary is based on the same estimates as the Authorised Limit but reflects the most likely, prudent but not worst case scenario without the additional headroom included within the Authorised Limit. The s151 Officer confirms that there were no breaches to the Authorised Limit and the Operational Boundary during 2021/22.

	Approved Operational Boundary 2021/22	Authorised Limit	Actual External Debt 30/09/2021	Compliance
	£m	2021/22	£m	
		£m		
Borrowing	166.350	173.550	95.010	Yes
Other Long Term Liabilities	0.400	0.600	0.224	Yes
Total	166.750	174.150	95.234	Yes

9.3 **Maturity Structure of Fixed Rate Borrowing.** This indicator is to limit large concentrations of fixed rate debt needing to be replaced at times of uncertainty over interest rates.

	Upper Limit	Actual at 30/09/2021	Actual at 30/09/2021	Compliance
	%	£m	%	
Under 12 months	15%	6.30	6.65%	Yes
12-24 months	15%	7.50	7.91%	Yes
2-5 years	30%	12.50	13.19%	Yes
5-10 years	100%	19.86	20.95%	Yes
Over 10 years	100%	48.64	51.30%	Yes

Limits to Investing Activity

- 9.4 **Security.** The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the value-weighted average credit rating of its investment portfolio. This is calculated by applying a score to each investment (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) and taking the arithmetic average, weighted by the size of each investment. Unrated investments are assigned a score based on their perceived risk.

Credit risk indicator	Target	Actual	Compliance
Portfolio average credit rating	A	AA+	Yes

- 9.5 **Liquidity Risk Indicator.** The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to liquidity risk by monitoring the amount of cash available to meet unexpected payments within a banding period, without additional borrowing.

Total cash available within;	Limit	Actual 30/09/21
3 months	100%	78%
3 - 12 months	80%	9%
over 12 months	40%	13%

- 9.6 **Principal Sums Invested for over 364 Days.** The purpose of this indicator is to control the Council's exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments

	Price Risk Limit 2021/22	Actual Investment 30/09/2021	Compliance
Limit on principal invested beyond year end	£15m	£7.5m	Yes

Limits to Capital Activity

- 9.7 **Capital Financing Requirement.** The table below shows the CFR, which is the underlying external need to incur borrowing for a capital purpose.

	2021/22	2021/22
	Original	Revised
	Estimate	Estimate
	£m	£m
CFR – non housing	42.772	30.183
CFR – housing	118.177	114.004
Total CFR	160.950	144.187
Estimated Net movement in CFR		-16.763

9.8 **Capital Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream.** Although capital expenditure is not charged directly to the revenue budget, interest payable on loans and MRP are charged to revenue, offset by any investment income receivable. The net annual charge is known as financing costs; this is compared to the net revenue stream i.e. the amount funded from Council Tax, business rates and general government grants.

	2021/22 Original Estimate £m	2021/22 Revised Estimate £m
General Fund		
Financing Costs	-0.351	-0.351
Proportion of net revenue stream	-1.69%	-1.69%
Housing Revenue Account		
Financing Costs	12.203	12.203
Proportion of net rental stream	48.72%	48.70%

10.0 Economic Background/Interest Rate Forecast

10.1 **Appendix A and Appendix B** gives a summarised outlook for the economic background and interest rate forecast from our Treasury Consultants, Link.

11.0 RECOMMENDATIONS that:-

- (a) the treasury management activity be noted and recommend to Full Council on 14 December; and**
- (b) the Prudential Indicators detailed in Section 9 of the report be noted.**

Background Papers

Nil

For further information, please contact Andrew Snape, Assistant Business Manager – Financial Services on extension 5523.

N. Wilson
Business Manager - Financial Services

Economics Update

MPC meeting 24.9.21

- The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted unanimously to leave Bank Rate unchanged at 0.10% and made no changes to its programme of quantitative easing purchases due to finish by the end of this year at a total of £895bn; two MPC members voted to stop the last £35bn of purchases as they were concerned that this would add to inflationary pressures.
- There was a major shift in the tone of the MPC's minutes at this meeting from the previous meeting in August which had majored on indicating that some tightening in monetary policy was now on the horizon, but also not wanting to stifle economic recovery by too early an increase in Bank Rate. In his press conference after the August MPC meeting, Governor Andrew Bailey said, "the challenge of avoiding a steep rise in unemployment has been replaced by that of ensuring a flow of labour into jobs" and that "the Committee will be monitoring closely the incoming evidence regarding developments in the labour market, and particularly unemployment, wider measures of slack, and underlying wage pressures." In other words, it was flagging up a potential danger that labour shortages could push up wage growth by more than it expects and that, as a result, CPI inflation would stay above the 2% target for longer. It also discounted sharp increases in monthly inflation figures in the pipeline in late 2021 which were largely propelled by events a year ago e.g., the cut in VAT in August 2020 for the hospitality industry, and by temporary shortages which would eventually work their way out of the system: in other words, **the MPC had been prepared to look through a temporary spike in inflation.**
- So, in August the country was just put on alert. However, this time the MPC's words indicated there had been a marked increase in concern that more recent increases in prices, particularly the increases in gas and electricity prices in October and due again next April, are, indeed, likely to lead to **faster and higher inflation expectations and underlying wage growth, which would in turn increase the risk that price pressures would prove more persistent next year than previously expected. Indeed, to emphasise its concern about inflationary pressures, the MPC pointedly chose to reaffirm its commitment to the 2% inflation target in its statement;** this suggested that it was now willing to look through the flagging economic recovery during the summer to prioritise bringing inflation down next year. This is a reversal of its priorities in August and a long way from words at earlier MPC meetings which indicated a willingness to look through inflation overshooting the target for limited periods to ensure that inflation was 'sustainably over 2%'. Indeed, whereas in August the MPC's focus was on getting through a winter of temporarily high energy prices and supply shortages, believing that inflation would return to just under the 2% target after reaching a high around 4% in late 2021, now its primary concern is that underlying price pressures in the economy are likely to get embedded over the next year and elevate future inflation to stay significantly above its 2% target and for longer.
- Financial markets are now pricing in a first increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25% in February 2022, but this looks ambitious as the MPC has stated that it wants to see what happens to the economy, and particularly to employment once furlough ends at the end of September. At the MPC's meeting in February it will only have available the employment figures for November: to get a clearer picture of employment trends, it would need to wait until the May meeting when it would have data up until February. At its May meeting, it will also have a clearer understanding of the likely peak of inflation.

- **The MPC's forward guidance on its intended monetary policy** on raising Bank Rate versus selling (quantitative easing) holdings of bonds is as follows: -
 1. Placing the focus on raising Bank Rate as “the active instrument in most circumstances”.
 2. Raising Bank Rate to 0.50% before starting on reducing its holdings.
 3. Once Bank Rate is at 0.50% it would stop reinvesting maturing gilts.
 4. Once Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%, it would start selling its holdings.
- **COVID-19 vaccines.** These have been the game changer which have enormously boosted confidence that **life in the UK could largely return to normal during the summer** after a third wave of the virus threatened to overwhelm hospitals in the spring. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in hard hit sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels. The big question is whether mutations of the virus could develop which render current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread.

US. See comments below on US treasury yields.

EU. The slow roll out of vaccines initially delayed economic recovery in early 2021 but the vaccination rate has picked up sharply since then. After a contraction in GDP of -0.3% in Q1, Q2 came in with strong growth of 2%, which is likely to continue into Q3, though some countries more dependent on tourism may struggle. Recent sharp increases in gas and electricity prices have increased overall inflationary pressures but the ECB is likely to see these as being only transitory after an initial burst through to around 4%, so is unlikely to be raising rates for a considerable time.

German general election. With the CDU/CSU and SPD both having won around 24-26% of the vote in the September general election, the composition of Germany's next coalition government may not be agreed by the end of 2021. An SPD-led coalition would probably pursue a slightly less restrictive fiscal policy, but any change of direction from a CDU/CSU led coalition government is likely to be small. However, with Angela Merkel standing down as Chancellor as soon as a coalition is formed, there will be a hole in overall EU leadership which will be difficult to fill.

China. After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of the year; this enabled China to recover all the initial contraction. During 2020, policy makers both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that was particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors helped to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies during 2020 and earlier in 2021. However, the pace of economic growth has now fallen back after this initial surge of recovery from the pandemic and China is now struggling to contain the spread of the Delta variant through sharp local lockdowns - which will also depress economic growth. There are also questions as to how effective Chinese vaccines are proving. In addition, recent regulatory actions motivated by a political agenda to channel activities into officially approved directions, are also likely to reduce the dynamism and long-term growth of the Chinese economy.

Japan. 2021 has been a patchy year in combating Covid. However, after a slow start, nearly 50% of the population are now vaccinated and Covid case numbers are falling. After a weak Q3 there is likely to be a strong recovery in Q4. The Bank of Japan is continuing its very loose monetary policy but with little prospect of getting inflation back above 1% towards its target of 2%, any time soon: indeed, inflation was negative in July. New Prime Minister Kishida has promised a large fiscal stimulus package after the November general election – which his party is likely to win.

World growth. World growth was in recession in 2020 but recovered during 2021 until starting to lose momentum more recently. Inflation has been rising due to increases in gas and electricity prices, shipping costs and supply shortages, although these should subside during 2022. It is likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a reversal of **world globalisation** and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products, and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates from those in prior decades.

Supply shortages. The pandemic and extreme weather events have been highly disruptive of extended worldwide supply chains. At the current time there are major queues of ships unable to unload their goods at ports in New York, California and China. Such issues have led to mis-distribution of shipping containers around the world and have contributed to a huge increase in the cost of shipping. Combined with a shortage of semi-conductors, these issues have had a disruptive impact on production in many countries. Many western countries are also hitting up against a difficulty in filling job vacancies. It is expected that these issues will be gradually sorted out, but they are currently contributing to a spike upwards in inflation and shortages of materials and goods on shelves.

Interest Rate Forecasts

The Council’s treasury advisor, Link Group, provided the following forecasts on 29th September 2021 (PWLB rates are certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80bps):

Link Group Interest Rate View		29.9.21								
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75
3 month ave eamings	0.10	0.10	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70
6 month ave eamings	0.20	0.20	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80
12 month ave eamings	0.30	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70
10 yr PWLB	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10
25 yr PWLB	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50	2.60
50 yr PWLB	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40

Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -

- *LIBOR and LIBID rates will cease from the end of 2021. Work is currently progressing to replace LIBOR with a rate based on SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average). In the meantime, our forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.*
- *Our forecasts for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short term cash at any one point in time.*

The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings.

As shown in the forecast table above, one increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25% has now been included in quarter 2 of 2022/23, a second increase to 0.50% in quarter 2 of 23/24 and a third one to 0.75% in quarter 4 of 23/24.

Significant risks to the forecasts

- COVID vaccines do not work to combat new mutations and/or new vaccines take longer than anticipated to be developed for successful implementation.
- The pandemic causes major long-term scarring of the economy.
- The Government implements an austerity programme that suppresses GDP growth.
- The MPC tightens monetary policy too early – by raising Bank Rate or unwinding QE.
- The MPC tightens monetary policy too late to ward off building inflationary pressures.
- Major stock markets e.g. in the US, become increasingly judged as being over-valued and susceptible to major price corrections. Central banks become increasingly exposed to the “moral hazard” risks of having to buy shares and corporate bonds to reduce the impact of major financial market sell-offs on the general economy.
- Geo-political risks are widespread e.g. German general election in September 2021 produces an unstable coalition or minority government and a void in high-profile leadership in the EU when Angela Merkel steps down as Chancellor of Germany; on-going global power influence struggles between Russia/China/US.

The balance of risks to the UK economy: -

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including residual risks from Covid and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

Forecasts for Bank Rate

Bank Rate is not expected to go up fast after the initial rate rise as the supply potential of the economy has not generally taken a major hit during the pandemic, so should be able to cope well with meeting demand without causing inflation to remain elevated in the medium-term, or to inhibit inflation from falling back towards the MPC's 2% target after the surge to around 4% towards the end of 2021. Three increases in Bank rate are forecast in the period to March 2024, ending at 0.75%. However, these forecasts may well need changing within a relatively short time frame for the following reasons: -

- There are increasing grounds for viewing the economic recovery as running out of steam during the summer and now into the autumn. This could lead into stagflation which would create a dilemma for the MPC as to which way to face.
- Will some current key supply shortages e.g., petrol and diesel, spill over into causing economic activity in some sectors to take a significant hit?
- Rising gas and electricity prices in October and next April and increases in other prices caused by supply shortages and increases in taxation next April, are already going to deflate consumer spending power without the MPC having to take any action on Bank Rate to cool inflation. Then we have the Government's upcoming budget in October, which could also end up in reducing consumer spending power.
- On the other hand, consumers are sitting on around £200bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so when will they spend this sum, in part or in total?
- There are 1.6 million people coming off furlough at the end of September; how many of those will not have jobs on 1st October and will, therefore, be available to fill labour shortages in many sectors of the economy? So, supply shortages which have been driving up both wages and costs, could reduce significantly within the next six months or so and alleviate the MPC's current concerns.
- There is a risk that there could be further nasty surprises on the Covid front, on top of the flu season this winter, which could depress economic activity.

In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, it is likely that these forecasts will need to be revised again soon - in line with what the new news is.

It also needs to be borne in mind that Bank Rate being cut to 0.10% was an emergency measure to deal with the Covid crisis hitting the UK in March 2020. At any time, the MPC could decide to simply take away that final emergency cut from 0.25% to 0.10% on the grounds of it no longer being warranted and as a step forward in the return to normalisation. In addition, any Bank Rate under 1% is both highly unusual and highly supportive of economic growth.

Forecasts for PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is likely to be a steady rise over the forecast period, with some degree of uplift due to rising treasury yields in the US.

There is likely to be **exceptional volatility and unpredictability in respect of gilt yields and PWLB rates** due to the following factors: -

- How strongly will changes in gilt yields be correlated to changes in US treasury yields?
- Will the Fed take action to counter increasing treasury yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?

- Would the MPC act to counter increasing gilt yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- How strong will inflationary pressures turn out to be in both the US and the UK and so impact treasury and gilt yields?
- How will central banks implement their new average or sustainable level inflation monetary policies?
- How well will central banks manage the withdrawal of QE purchases of their national bonds i.e., without causing a panic reaction in financial markets as happened in the “taper tantrums” in the US in 2013?
- Will exceptional volatility be focused on the short or long-end of the yield curve, or both?

The forecasts are also predicated on an assumption that there is no break-up of the Eurozone or EU within our forecasting period, despite the major challenges that are looming up, and that there are no major ructions in international relations, especially between the US and China / North Korea and Iran, which have a major impact on international trade and world GDP growth.

Gilt and treasury yields

Since the start of 2021, there has been a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PwLB rates. During the first part of the year, US President Biden’s, and the Democratic party’s determination to push through a \$1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the Covid pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. However, this was in addition to the \$900bn support package already passed in December 2020 under President Trump. This was then followed by additional Democratic ambition to spend further huge sums on infrastructure and an American families plan over the next decade which are caught up in Democrat / Republican haggling. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus, which is much bigger than in other western economies, was happening at a time in the US when: -

1. A fast vaccination programme has enabled a rapid opening up of the economy.
2. The economy had already been growing strongly during 2021.
3. It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries. A combination of shortage of labour and supply bottle necks is likely to stoke inflationary pressures more in the US than in other countries.
4. And the Fed was still providing monetary stimulus through monthly QE purchases.

These factors could cause an excess of demand in the economy which could then unleash stronger and more sustained inflationary pressures in the US than in other western countries. This could then force the Fed to take much earlier action to start tapering monthly QE purchases and/or increasing the Fed rate from near zero, despite their stated policy being to target average inflation. It is notable that some Fed members have moved forward their expectation of when the first increases in the Fed rate will occur in recent Fed meetings. In addition, more recently, shortages of workers appear to be stoking underlying wage inflationary pressures which are likely to feed through into CPI inflation. A run of strong monthly jobs growth figures could be enough to meet the threshold set by the Fed of “substantial further progress towards the goal of reaching full employment”. However, the weak growth in August, (announced 3.9.21), has spiked anticipation that tapering of monthly QE purchases could start by the end of 2021. These purchases are currently acting as downward pressure on treasury yields. As the US financial markets are, by far, the biggest financial markets in the world, any trend upwards in the US will invariably impact and influence financial markets in other countries. However, during June and July, longer term yields fell sharply; even the large non-farm payroll increase in the first week of August seemed to cause the markets little concern, which is somewhat puzzling, particularly in the context of the concerns of many commentators that inflation may not be as transitory as the Fed is expecting it to be. Indeed, inflation pressures and erosion of surplus economic capacity look much stronger in the US

than in the UK. **As an average since 2011, there has been a 75% correlation between movements in 10 year treasury yields and 10 year gilt yields. This is a significant UPWARD RISK exposure to our forecasts for longer term PWLB rates. However, gilt yields and treasury yields do not always move in unison.**

There are also possible **DOWNSIDE RISKS** from the huge sums of cash that the UK populace have saved during the pandemic; when savings accounts earn little interest, it is likely that some of this cash mountain could end up being invested in bonds and so push up demand for bonds and support their prices i.e., this would help to keep their yields down. How this will interplay with the Bank of England eventually getting round to not reinvesting maturing gilts and then later selling gilts, will be interesting to keep an eye on.

The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates: -

- There is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

A new era – a fundamental shift in central bank monetary policy

One of the key results of the pandemic has been a fundamental rethinking and shift in monetary policy by major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB, to tolerate a higher level of inflation than in the previous two decades when inflation was the prime target to bear down on so as to stop it going above a target rate. There is now also a greater emphasis on other targets for monetary policy than just inflation, especially on ‘achieving broad and inclusive “maximum” employment in its entirety’ in the US before consideration would be given to increasing rates.

- The Fed in America has gone furthest in adopting a monetary policy based on a clear goal of allowing the inflation target to be symmetrical, (rather than a ceiling to keep under), so that inflation averages out the dips down and surges above the target rate, over an unspecified period of time.
- The Bank of England has also amended its target for monetary policy so that inflation should be ‘sustainably over 2%’ and the ECB now has a similar policy.
- **For local authorities, this means that investment interest rates and very short term PWLB rates will not be rising as quickly or as high as in previous decades when the economy recovers from a downturn and the recovery eventually runs out of spare capacity to fuel continuing expansion.**
- Labour market liberalisation since the 1970s has helped to break the wage-price spirals that fuelled high levels of inflation and has now set inflation on a lower path which makes this shift in monetary policy practicable. In addition, recent changes in flexible employment practices, the rise of the gig economy and technological changes, will all help to lower inflationary pressures.
- Governments will also be concerned to see interest rates stay lower as every rise in central rates will add to the cost of vastly expanded levels of national debt; (in the UK this is £21bn for each 1% rise in rates). On the other hand, higher levels of inflation will help to erode the real value of total public debt.